It's been two months since the Senate passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000. At the time it was thought that we could have anew bankruptcy law by spring. Well, Spring has sprung and, as of this writing, the Congressional leadership has not even picked the people to work out the differences between the House and Senate versions of the bill.
But that doesn't mean they're not trying to move the legislation. In fact, there's a lot of behind the scenes maneuvering to get this bill out of conference and onto the President's desk.
Here's what's up.
While formal conferences have not been appointed, informal conferences have been working for weeks. It seemed on April 7th that the unofficial Senate conferences had worked out compromises on the bill's controversial provisions, such as the proposed minimum wage increase, and were ready to have them reviewed by their counterparts in the House. However, as the Easter recess approached, it was unclear whether the unofficial House delegation reviewed the Senate's compromise offer.
What was clear was that not enough headway had been made for the leadership to appoint an official conference. Which raises the question of whether this bill will ever see a conference.
If the impasse cannot be overcome, it is believed Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott, R-Miss., will try to tack the bankruptcy provisions - the original and "non-controversial" part of the bill - onto another bill that is already in conference. Such an attempt to add legislation to a bill pending in conference is not an unusual action.
According to several sources, a bill setting standards for electronic signatures may be the most likely candidate to have the bankruptcy bill grafted onto it. However, the conference committee working out the differences between the Senate's Millennium Digital Commerce Act and the House's Electronic Signatures In Global and National Commerce Act have had their own problems moving the legislation forward.
Stay tuned.
Too Much Debt Can Make You Sick! Research Shows Link Between Credit Card Debt And Bad Health
Too many credit card bills may be bad for your physical health. According to researchers at Ohio State University, people who reported higher levels of stress about their debts showed higher levels of physical impairment and worse health. The situation was exacerbated when the debt involved was incurred through the use of credit cards.
"Any one of us who has debt knows that it can cause stress in our lives and it makes sense that this stress may be bad for our health," commented Professor Paul J. Lavrakas, director of OSU's Center for Survey Research and co-author along with University of Alabama Professor Patricia Drentea of "Over The Limit: The association among health, race, and debt," published in the February 2000 issue of Social Science and Medicine.
"The stress of owing money and knowing that we're paying high interest rates may lead to increased stress resulting in worsening health."
Lavrakas concedes that the results of his study are not surprising. Nevertheless, he believes this is the first time that the connection between credit card debt and health has been examined.
In an article published on the Op-Ed page of the New York Times on April 20, 2000, Professor Stephen Gillers, the Vice Dean and Professor of Legal Ethics at New York University Law School described the impact of the Supreme Court's two rulings in Terry Williams v. Taylor and Michael Williams v. Taylor, as "two death penalty decisions, no great principles." The full article is entitled "The Court's Picayune Power." Some of the professor's comments were so significant that they deserve special mention.
Professor Gillers wrote:
"The Supreme Court gave two Virginia death row inmates reprieves on Tuesday. But its opinions invoked neither the grand theme of justice possibly miscarried nor the historical importance of the great writ of habeas corpus, which permits federal judges to review the work of state judges. Instead, victory for the prisoners, a rare event in the current court, turned on the meaning of such everyday words as 'unreasonable' and 'failed.'
"This change in the jurisprudence of death denies the court the towering role it once had of ensuring constitutionally fair criminal trials. Instead, the court now engages in the kind of semantic hairsplitting that we associate with scholars of ancient texts. The court is like a giant tethered to a stake: It is able to use its vast powers only in the small orbit allowed by Congress and its own decisions . . . . .
"Two convicted murderers seemed to have substantial claims that their death sentences had been improperly imposed, yet the court also had to contend with restrictions on its power of review. Doing justice required the court to consult the dictionary more than the Constitution. Even the most conservative justices chafed at the apparent limits on their power . . . . . Maybe reducing the Supreme Court to this sort of picayune analysis is the inevitable price we pay for our days of freewheeling habeas review. Too much judicial freedom has given way to too little. Eventually, we may learn the lesson that neither extreme serves the goals of justice."
Court Should Not Impute Higher Income To Parent Who Had Legitimate Reasons To Take Lower-Paying Job
The facts in In Re: Paternity of E.M.P., 722 N.E.2d 349 (Ind.App.2000) are: Eva Eskew had a child in 1992. In 1994 a paternity order was entered establishing that Darren Beavers was the father, ordering him to pay $45 per week in child support. After the birth of that child, Darren had two more children, and when his marriage ended in divorce, Darren was ordered to pay $165 per week in child support.
In 1998 Eva asked for an increase in child support for her child. At that time Darren was employed as a garbage collector. In 1996 he earned $34,708, in 1997 he earned $36,028, and in 1998 he earned $46,680. Eight days before the final hearing on the support modification, Darren quit his job and started working for GTE, making $12.10 per hour, or $25,168 per year. He testified he changed jobs because of his bad knees, health concerns arising from previous on-the-job injuries and to receive better benefits.
The trial court found Darren was voluntarily underemployed and based the child support on his 1998 income. Because Darren had two subsequent children, the support was reduced by 0.903, the appropriate factor established by the Guidelines, and Darren was ordered to pay $115.80 each week for child support. He was also ordered to pay Eva's attorney fees in the amount of $800.
Darren appealed, arguing he had a legitimate reason to change to a lower-paying job and the trial court erred in finding he was voluntarily underemployed and in calculating his support based upon potential income. A parent may have legitimate reasons to leave employment or take a lower-paying job. Darren testified, as a garbage collector, he lifted 20-24 tons of garbage for 6 - 7 1/2 hours per day. He was very tired after work, was only interested in sleeping, and did not want to continue in that manner for the next 40 years. He had injured and bad knees. He would make more money over time in his new job, and he had better benefits.
The Court of Appeals determined that his decline in income was not for the purpose of reducing his child support obligation. Darren had legitimate reasons for quitting his job and taking a new job at lower pay. Therefore, there was no basis for a determination that Darren was voluntarily underemployed for the purpose of reducing his child support.
Darren also argued the trial court should have reduced his gross weekly income by the actual amount of child support he was ordered to pay for his two subsequent children. The Child Support Guidelines provide for an adjustment of a certain percentage for subsequent children living in the household. Darren's children did not live with him. The Guidelines also provide for reduction of the amount of court-ordered child support for children born prior to the children for whom the current support order is established. Darren was not entitled to any adjustment to his gross weekly income. Nevertheless, the trial court did adjust his income by 0.903, the factor for two children living with the obligor. Even so, Darren appealed that he should have his subsequent support subtracted, arguing it is a "logical inconsistency" in the Guidelines. The Court of Appeals did not agree. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
[Res Gestae, April 2000, Volume 43, No.10, Copyright 2000, Indiana State Bar Association.]
